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ARTICLES
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR SUMMARY

W.

BROOKE GRAiVSE*

Although the United States is usually regarded as a young country,
its history stretches back over several centuries. Several states have
recently held Tercentenary Celebrations, North Carolina and Rhode
Island in 1963, and New Jersey in 1964, while Maryland in 1963 noted
its 329th anniversary. More exactly, however, the present constitutions date, not from the founding of the colonies but from the Revolutionary period and the establishment of the present governments.
Thus the American people have been in the business of writing,
amending, and revising state constitutions for almost 200 years. It all
began when, pursuant to a resolution adopted by the Continental Congress on May 15, 1776, the people of the various states began to prepare constitutions, in anticipation of their new status as independent
states. There are some interesting points regarding these original
constitutions.
In most matters of government and law, the people tended to follow the English precedents. But Britain did not have and never has had
a written constitution in the sense in which American constitutions have
been written. The adoption of these original constitutions marked the
beginning of what has developed into a firm American commitment
to the idea of the written constitution.
It would be incorrect to regard these documents as "new," for in
most respects, they were not. They consisted of a combination of two
elements: a summary of the political ideas that then prevailed, and a
carry-over of many of the provisions of the colonial charters, pro*Cornell Univ., A.B. (1921); Univ. of Pennsylvania, M.A. (1923), Ph.D. (1936). Senior

Specialists Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. Author, Major
Problems in Constitutional Revision (Chicago, 1960), and American Intergovernmental
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prietary grants and other instruments under which the colonies had
been governed. The constitutions, then, represented no sharp break
with the past. Most of the new constitutions were promptly framed
and adopted, some with considerable change in the colonial charters,
others with very little. A few states continued to function under their
old charters for a number of years-Connecticut until 1819, Rhode
Island until 1842.
Theoretically these documents, conceived as one aspect of what
Harvey Wheeler calls participational democracy, were not expected to
be long enduring. On the contrary, it -was Jefferson's belief that governments tended automatically to grow away from the needs and wishes
of the people. Therefore these constitutions should be revised often;
a revolution, he thought, should occur every generation. But in practice revisions have not been frequent. In all these years, Massachusetts,
although it has had several conventions, has never adopted a revised
constitution. The average life of a state constitution, formerly regarded as approximately a generation, has tended to increase. The
revisions that have taken place have often served as the vehicle through
which the tenets of participational democracy was institutionalized, but
they have seldom been even mildly revolutionary. Even in those jurisdictions in which conventions have been held,. few of them have actually resulted in thorough and extensive revision.
State constitutions have not only tended to have a longer life, but to
become longer.' This development arises out of several considerations.
Modest increases have grown out of new needs and changing conditions, reflected in piecemeal amendments, extensive increases out of the
tendency of pressure groups to seek protection for their pet ideas and
projects by giving them constitutional status, resulting in the masses
2
of legislative detail which encumber so many of our constitutions.
With these few observations on the general background of constitution making at the state level, attention is now directed to the developments of the last quarter of a century-including procedural questions in constitutional revision, substantive changes, and the prospects
for constitutional change during the next few years.
1. De Grazia, Alfred. State Constitutions-Are They Growing Longer? State Government, April 1954, pp. 82-83.
2. For a discussion of this in one state, see Owen, Kimbrough, The Need for Constitutional Revision in Louisiana. Louisiana Law Review, November 1947, pp. 1-104.
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PROCEDURAL MATTERS

With this long experience in constitution making, one would expect
that an established procedure or methodology of constitution making
and a good deal of skill in using it might have been developed. This
clearly does not appear to be the case, as the discussion which follows
will show. The states have simultaneously developed both an extraordinary variety of procedures and a resistance to using them that is
nearly as great. Perhaps this is because the whole process appears to be
somewhat distasteful and something to be postponed as long as possible, or avoided altogether, that scholars in the field of government
and law have given such scant attention to public law at the state level. 3
Constitutional revision was formerly accomplished by conventions
composed of popularly elected delegates, and some still are. But in this
mid-Twentieth Century period, they tend more and more to be accomplished by appointed commissions composed of community leaders
and experts rather than by popularly chosen delegates, whose purpose,
Wheeler contends, "is to dismantle the archaic institutional remains of
participational democracy. Their theme is to strengthen the executive,
give him a larger staff and more authority over administrative agencies,
and firm up his hand against legislators." 4
Setting the Stage for ConstitutionalRevision
For a variety of reasons, constitutional revision has come to be a
time-consuming, costly and exceedingly difficult undertaking. Since the
public seems to have little idea of what a constitution is, why it exists,
how its provisions affect their daily lives, why it needs changing or
how to change it, the first step in achieving constitutional revision is
to create an awareness of need on the part of the public. Public demand
for change is essential before the cumbersome machinery of revision
can be put in motion. Such a demand can be developed only by means
of a campaign of education, and this in turn, can be effectively conducted only after a great deal of preparatory work has been done.
The usual procedure is to establish a study commission which can
serve the two-fold purpose of providing factual information for the
campaign-information which can be used again later when and if the
campaign succeeds in bringing a constitutional convention into ex3. See Mitau, G. Theodore. What Has Happened to the Study of State Public Law
by Political Scientists? Journal of Public Law, v. 14, No. 1, 1965, pp. 90-104.
4. Wheeler, Harvey, The Rise and Fall of Political Democracy, p. 16. Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, 1966.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:1

istence. Such a commission can be appointed by the governor on his
own initiative, or as a result of legislative action, authorizing and directing that such a commission be established. Or it can come about
under private initiative, and be privately financed. This procedure is
sometimes necessary when the legislature refuses or at least fails to
provide the necessary funds.
When, in time, the information has been gathered and used, and
it is judged that the time is right, plans may be made for a statewide
referendum on the question of holding a convention. This brings the
supporters of revision face to face with an often hostile legislature and
the almost unbelievable tangle of legal technicalities that has been established in many states for the purpose of making constitutional revision difficult if not impossible. 5 To begin with, legislatures almost
invariably regard revision with indifference or apathy, if they do not
actively oppose it. It is much easier and politically far safer to support
the status quo. This attitude on the part of the legislature is often
reinforced by built-in barriers in the state constitution.
-While in most states the legislature or the legislature and a referendum can bring a constitutional convention into existence, there are
significant exceptions. In nine states a majority vote of the legislature
and the referendum are sufficient, but Nebraska requires a three-fifths
vote and the referendum. Seventeen states require a vote of two-thirds
and the referendum, but New Mexico requires a three-fourths vote
plus the referendum. A majority vote of two successive legislatures
plus a referendum is necessary in Kentucky, and a convention may
be brought about by initiative petition in Oregon. It is somewhat easier
to obtain favorable legislative action if the state constitution provides,
as those of eleven states now do, for a periodic submission of this ques6
tion to the voters.
In some jurisdictions, however, it has been found that it was just not
possible, under existing constitutional provisions, to bring the question
5. See Hindman, Wilbert L., Road-Blocks to Conventions. National MunicipalReview,
March 1948, pp. 129-132, 144, in which legal, political and psychological barriers are
discussed.
6. Such a submission is mandatory every seven years in New Hampshire, every ten
years in Iowa, every sixteen years in Michigan, and every twenty years in Maryland,
Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Oklahoma. The Model State Constitution specifies
fifteen years.
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of revision to a vote. Best known of these was Illinois, where a prolonged campaign was necessary to secure the adoption of a Gateway
Amendment before further effort for constitutional revision could be
undertaken. The State of Connecticut had a similar experience in 19561957. But winning a majority in the referendum, if one can succeed
in getting a referendum authorized, may not be enough. In a number
of states, the constitution requires not merely a majority of those voting
on the question but a majority of those voting in the election.7 This
has been a stumbling block in many states on many occasions. In each
of these instances, noncontroversial and nonpartisan proposals with no
declared opposition failed to win approval because the blank ballots
were sufficient to prevent a majority of the total votes cast at the
election. Even when -this obstacle has been overcome, still another
battle with the legislature may be in store.
Not content with having employed every conceivable dilatory tactic
to delay if not actually to prevent a referendum, the legislative leaders
may decide to ignore or to defy the expressed wishes of a majority
of the voters. The point is that a popular majority in favor of holding
a convention does not for one moment mean that a convention will be
held, as experience in several states has clearly demonstrated. Legislation must be adopted providing for the holding of the convention,
specifying its size and composition, its time and place of meeting, its
organization and procedure, and providing funds to pay its expenses.
Until this legislation is enacted, there can be no convention. The whole
process can be expedited by selecting delegates at the same time the
referendum is held, but this procedure can be used only on those rare
occasions when the supporters of revision have a friendly legislature.
When this procedure can be used, the election of the convention delegates becomes valid and effective only when the enabling act for the
convention has been passed.
But the present concern is with those instances in which, for one
reason or another, the legislation is never passed. The people of Iowa
voted for a convention in 1920. The legislature never did provide for
the holding of the convention, 8 now it is assumed that a new mandate
7. Around 1940 in Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan; a few years later in
Alabama, Arizona, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia.
and Wisconsin. See the Book of the States, 1943-1944, p. 108. This occurred in Minnesota on two different occasions.
8. Professor Herman H. Trachsel describes this experience: "The vote of the people
was 279,652 for and 221,763 against calling a convention. On January 20, 1921, a bill
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from the people would be required. The same thing happened in
California in 1934, following a favorable vote on an initiated proposal
for a convention, and again in 1945-1946, and in Maryland after a
favorable popular vote in 1950. In the latter case, the two houses
became involved in a hassle over the terms of the convention legislation. The leaders being unable to come to an agreement, the 1951
session was permitted to expire without any action being taken. Ever
since, the fight for constitutional revision has continued in this state.
A study commission was created in 1965. A new referendum is scheduled for the Fall of 1966, so that, barring a repetition of past mishaps,
a constitutional convention may be held in Maryland in 1967.
All of which may lead one to observe that the advocate of constitutional reform in an American state should be endowed with the patience of Job and the sense of time of a geologist. This may not be
an absolute requirement, but it is almost certain to be helpful.
Available Procedures
If the American people had been even half as effective in up-dating
their constitutions as they have been in devising procedures for doing
the job or to prevent its being done, every single one of the fifty state
constitutions would be today in shipshape condition. The variety of
available procedures is truly astonishing, and it may well be that their
very abundance and variety impedes progress. There are relatively
few people in a position to know the advantages and disadvantages of
each different procedure and capable of evaluating them. The very
multiplicity of procedures affords an opportunity for each to enlist its
supporters, and for conflict among them. 9
was introduced into the House of Representatives making provision 'for a convention
to revise and amend the constitution, naming the number of delegates and districts;
.' This bill passed the House on March 15 and was messaged to the Senate the
following day. On March 30, it passed the Senate with amendments which the House
refused to accept. A Conference Committee was appointed; but the House rejected its
report on April 2, which was the last day of the session. Thus the General Assembly
adjourned without making any provision for a constitutional convention.
In support of the position taken by the General Assembly, some of the members and
others insisted that there was no popular demand for a revision of the constitution. One
representative, however, did not believe the General Assembly 'should override the
wishes of the people.' Another said 'the people expressed a wish for the convention
and it is for the Assembly to make necessary machinery for it.' Every ten years the
question is submitted to the voters on a separate ballot."
9. See Sturm, Albert L., Methods of State ConstitutionalReform. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1954.

1966]

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The principal methods, of course, are the constitutional convention,
the constitutional commission, and the piecemeal amending procedure.
Any of these methods can be used by itself or in combination with
other devices or procedures. Then, in addition, there are at least a half
dozen minor methods, including editorial revision and codification, initiative and referendum, legislative revision, and draft constitutions prepared by law institutes, bar associations, or other groups. Attention is
now directed to an analysis of recent experience with these several
devices.
Constitutional Conventions. A constitutional convention "is a rather
unique and unusual American institution." These are the words of
Professor James K. Pollock, distinguished political scientist and member of the recent Michigan Constitutional Convention, who continues
that it is "an institution utilized upon occasion by individual states to
bring their machinery of government into accord with the conditions
and circumstances of the time." 10 This is a good statement of the purpose of a convention.
One's attitude toward the constitutional convention depends to a
large extent upon his general orientation and point of view. To those
who understand the need for constitutional revision and modernization,
and their importance, the constitutional convention is regarded as the
best and most satisfactory means of accomplishing this objective. All
but twelve states make specific provision for conventions, and even in
these their use has been upheld by judicial decision. To those who,
for whatever reasons, are opposed to constitutional revision to begin
with, the convention is the most feared and hated of the various procedures and techniques available for constitutional change. Most of
all, they fear that if the whole gamut of constitutional issues is opened
up for discussion and review, as they are in an unlimited convention,
things may get out of hand, so to speak, and some benefit, exemption
or privilege which they presently enjoy may be either diminished or
abolished. These opponents, however, forget that constitutional conventions tend to be far more conservative than radical.
So the opponents of constitutional revision normally tend strongly
to oppose the convention method. If they lose out on this issue, their
strategy is to permit as little revision as possible. And, in practice,
10. Making Michigan's New Constitution, 1961-1962, pp. 1-2. George Wahr Publishing
Company, Ann Arbor, 1962.
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this means putting up a fight for a limited convention. At this point, it
becomes essential to distinguish clearly between a limited constitutional
convention, on the one hand, and an open or unrestricted convention
on the other.
Limited constitutional conventions, while not unknown in the past,
were never widely used prior to 1947, when the backers of constitutional revision in New Jersey were forced into making the difficult
choice between having a convention from which the issue of legislative
apportionment was excluded from consideration by a strongly worded
pledge, and having no convention at all. The convention backers chose
the first of these alternatives. And so developed the precedent from
which the recent trend toward limited conventions has developed.
This development has occurred in spite of grave doubts regarding
the validity of the limited convention concept. It was determined in
the courts long ago that the powers of a constitutional convention
when acting with the established sphere of such a body, are complete
and plenary. Hence a convention is not bound by legislative attempts
to limit or prescribe the scope of its activities. The supporters of revision in New Jersey knew this, but they decided to go along with
the limitation, not because the limitation had any legal effect-which
it did not-but because the charge of bad faith that would certainly
have been made might work possibly irreparable damage to the cause
of constitutional revision in the state. The leaders have regretted ever
since, not only the unhappy alternatives that confronted them, but the
seemingly lasting effects of the choice they made.
The limited convention device has since been used repeatedly to
deal with special situations, more or less of an emergency character, but
unfortunately also, opponents of general constitutional revision have
seized upon it as a clever device for preventing the general revision and
modernization that is sorely needed in so many of the states.
A number of specific illustrations of both types may be cited. Emergency situations developed in Virginia in 1945-1946 with regard to
absentee voting by citizens in the Armed Services. They developed in
North Carolina and Virginia-in fact in the whole Southern Regionregarding school integration after the Supreme Court decision in Brow'z
v. Topeka. In New Jersey and other states, this device has been used,
or its use is being planned in an effort to solve apportionment problems.
In all of these instances, and doubtless in many others, limited constitutional conventions were hurriedly brought into being to deal with
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the situation. These uses of the limited convention device in emergency situations are certainly understandable, and in some instances,
probably justifiable.
This cannot be said, however, when the device is used to prevent
general revision where this is clearly needed. Perhaps the best illustration of this is found in Tennessee which has held two limited constitutional conventions in the last decade. The first, the convention of
1952-1953, was limited to eight clearly specified subjects. The convention met, considered these subjects and no others, and proposed
constitutional amendments regarding them. The amendments were
submitted to the voters and approved. In this sense, Tennessee's first
limited convention was a success. It brought about remedial action
with regard to a few matters, and broke down the idea that the Nation's only unamended constitution could not be amended. It was a
failure in that it prevented the broad review and general discussion of
other provisions in the constitution also in need of modernization and
change. Apparently fascinated by their apparent success, another limited convention was called a few years later, in 1959, to deal with three
very minor matters, only one of which was acted upon. It was generally agreed that a constitutional convention should never have been
called to consider such a meagre agenda of insignificant matters. In
1960, the Kentucky electorate voted against a convention that could
have been limited to twelve important subjects.
This is not the place to present an encyclopedic account of the constitutional conventions that have been held in the last few decades.
While the Twentieth Century cannot be characterized as a period of
great activity or of great distinction in the making and remaking of
state constitutions, there have been a good many conventions. Some
of these hold far greater interest and importance for the student of
public law than do others. In order to give a broad view of the important characteristics of a selected group of conventions, a summary
table regarding them is presented on pages 44-45. In this table, comparative data on such questions as size, type (limited or unlimited),
place of meeting, committee structure (both temporary and permanent
committees), size of staff, and duration are presented. Whatever proposals for change may emerge from such bodies must be submitted to
the electorate for their approval or rejection.
Constitutional Commissions. Constitutional commissions have come
to be widely used for a variety of reasons, and in many different ways,

10
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as a part of the process of constitutional revision. They may serve as
a means of spotlighting major issues and educating the voters, as a preparatory body for a convention, or they may themselves undertake and
carry through the task of constitutional revision. Only Georgia (1943)
and Virginia (1929) have achieved a complete revision by this method.
The popularity of commissions in mid-Twentieth Century appears to
have been inspired largely by the success in these two states. The Oregon Commission (1961) drafted a new constitution, but it was not
adopted.
Although many advantages are claimed for the commission device,
it also has important disadvantages. Its advantages are reputed to be
that, being a small and prestigious body with a specific and important
task to perform in a limited time, it can attract the most able men. It
is far less costly than a convention. Most important of all, in the eyes of
many, it can be used as a substitute for a convention. Professors Rich
and Sturm are among the most careful students of the commission
device. The former notes that few of these bodies measure up to
expectations, that the members are subject to the same prejudices and
political pressures as are the members of a legislature or a convention,
and that they have "one inherent and fatal weakness in that their every
act is measured in terms of what they believe the legislature will accept." The fact that they must report to the legislature may in itself
constitute an almost insurmountable barrier to thoroughgoing revision."
Since the reporting on such matters is so casual and disorganized, it
is sometimes difficult to assemble complete and accurate information
regarding them on such a simple matter as the number created in any
given period of time. Each biennial issue of The Book of the States
reports briefly on the work of several. In the 1966-1967 volume, recently released, commissions are noted in Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Nebraska, North Dakota and Pennsylvania during the preceding biennium. Professor Sturm reports that, on the basis of a recent survey,
there has been a considerably increasing use of this device during the
past fifteen years. 1 2 On this point, he says:
11. Rich, Bennett M., Convention or Commission? National Municipal Review, March
1948, pp. 133-139. Thoroughly revised and updated, this article appears as a chapter in
a symposium edited by the author, Major Problems in State Constitutional Revision
Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1960.
12. Sturm, Albert L., and Craig, James B., Jr., State Constitutional Commissions:
Fifteen Years of Increasing Use. State Government, v. 39, Winter 1966, pp. 56-63.
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Since midcentury four commissions have been established in each
of two states, three each in two states, two each in five states, and
one in each of the remaining fourteen states.
He regards the increasing recent use of constitutional commissions since
1950, and especially in the decade of the Sixties as particularly significant:
Of the thirty-eight commissions established in the 1950-1965 period,
three were created in the first five years (1950-1954), eleven during
the next five years (1955-1959), eighteen in the third five-year period
(1960-1964), and six in 1965 alone.
Some of these were established by statute, some by executive order,
others by legislative resolution. A summary of some basic information
regarding commissions established in twelve selected states is included
in Table II, pages 46-47. These twelve states account for approximately
one-third of the thirty-eight commissions created since 1950. These
particular states and commissions were chosen because, for one reason
or another, they were thought to be important or significant examples
of the commission device at work.
One needs always to keep in mind the fact that few commissions
actually do the revising job themselves, serving rather than as one phase
of a process which may extend over a period of many years. They
may be instructed merely to explore the question as to whether revision
is actually needed, and if they so conclude, to make recommendations.
Or they may stage an educational campaign to promote revision, or
engage in preparation for a convention that they hope will be created.
Their role in the revision process is rarely a simple one, and it shows
no tendency toward being standardized.
Piecemeal Amending Procedure. Among the remaining methods to
be considered here are revision through piecemeal amendment or by
acceptance of a draft constitution prepared by a law institute, bar association or other responsible organization. Actually, Pennsylvania has
made some progress in what may turn out to be a successful venture
in constitution making through a combination of these two devices. It
has often been urged that a state constitution could be kept up-to-date
by use of the piecemeal amending procedure. Such an argument sounds
plausible enough and, it must be admitted that this was the original
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intent when state legislatures were authorized to submit proposed
amendments to the voters for their approval or rejection. But in practice, this procedure has never been successful; in fact, it may be argued
that it has been more of a hindrance than a help in keeping a state
constitution well ordered, modern and up-to-date. A few states have
claimed that they were doing this, but an examination of their constitutions reveals little to substantiate their claims.' 3
Just as Pennsylvania has tried to use the piecemeal amending procedure as a means of securing adoption of an article by article draft
prepared by the state bar association, California is using this procedure
as a means of securing adoption of an article by article revision which
is the work of the Constitution Revision Commission, created by the
legislature in 1964. A report issued in February 1966 presented the
results of its work on seven articles; it was assumed that by October 1,
1966, when the life of the Commission expired, it would have completed
its work on the remaining articles of the constitution 14 as it did.
Generally, however, the piecemeal amending procedure's fragmentary approach to constitutional problems has not demonstrated that it
possesses much fitness for dealing with such fundamental and highly
complicated problems as streamlining the organization and procedures
of the three branches of government, of the tax and fiscal system and
the system for constitutional revision itself-all of which must be effec-

tively dealt with if constitutional modernization is going to be anything
more than an idle dream.
Other Procedures and Devices
Many states have improvised procedures and devices for revising their
constitutions. Most of these owe their origin to a desire to avoid the
"dangers" of a constitutional convention. One such device is editorial
13. See discussion of the concept of continuous revision below, and the Gardner

article on North Carolina, therein cited.
14. Proposed Revision of the California Constitution. San Francisco, February 1966.
Among recent studies of state experience with the use of the piecemeal amending procedure, see the author's Major Problems in State Constitutional Revision, Chapter 7.
Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1960; Dickson, David F., Proposed Amendments
to the Florida Constitution of 1885. Institute of Governmental Research, Florida State
University. Tallahassee, May 1966; Folmar, Richard H., Piecemeal Amendment of the
New Mexico Constitution, 1911 to 1964, Third Edition. New Mexico Legislative
Council Service, Santa Fe, May 1965.
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revision and codification-a chore which may be assigned to the state
supreme court. This cannot be regarded as, and should not be confused
with, bona fide constitutional revision. As a matter of fact, any real
revision is specifically prohibited by a mandate that no changes in substance shall be made. Thus this procedure becomes in practice a sort
of tidying up operation, useful in bringing some semblance of order
into an ancient document grown long and confusing through the addition of multitudes of amendments. This procedure has been used with
some degree of success in several of the New England States-Massachusetts in 1919, Maine in 1952-1953, and Connecticut in 1953. A new
proposal of this type is now pending in Massachusetts. 5 These "new
constitutions" were really not new at all, but merely the earlier constitutions in a better ordered and more usable form.
In fourteen states, the people may bring about a constitutional
amendment through the initiative procedure.' 6 Although this device
has been little used, some illustrations may be cited. In 1946, the voters
of Michigan used it to accomplish a diversion of sales tax revenues to
school districts and cities. In 1948, it was used in California to earmark
revenues for old age assistance. The voters of Oregon in 1952 and of
Washington in 1956 used it to effect a solution of their apportionment
problems. The victories attained were in both instances short-lived
because the legislatures promptly proceeded to emasculate the amendments, and were upheld by the courts in so doing.
The legislature may, although fortunately it rarely does take upon
itself the task of revising the constitution. The word "fortunately"
was used here advisedly because there is good reason for serious doubts
regarding the propriety of this procedure. It is not a new procedure.
During its history as a state, South Carolind has had five constitutional
conventions and has been governed by seven constitutions, two of
which were written by the General Assembly.1 7 At least four states are
now or have been experimenting with this device in recent years:
California, Florida, New Jersey and Oregon. For quite different reasons, each of these experiences has been unique. The California experi15. See Legislative Research Council, Report Relative to Constitutional Revision
Procedures. Senate Report No. 845, Boston, March 1966.
16. These are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon.
17. See Larson, James E., Constitutional Revision. University of South CarolinaGovermnental Review, May 1966, entire issue.
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ment is still under way. It came about because two earlier commissions
(1929 and 1947) recognized what they called "the need for allowing
a revision of the Constitution to be proposed by the legislature". Until
1962, the only certain way by which the California Constitution could
be revised was by a constitutional convention. There is, of course, a
constitutional provision authorizing the legislature to propose amendments, but the use of the word "amendment" seemed to denote something less-presumably much less-than the overall constitutional revision that is needed. Hence the creation of the Constitutional Revision
Commission whose work has now been completed."8 The portions so
far published seem to have been prepared with commendable thoroughness and care.
In 1963, the legislature of Florida proposed and in 1964 the voters
approved at the general election a constitutional amendment authorizing
the legislature to undertake a general revision of the constitution, submitting their recommendations to the electorate. This they did in the
form of a series of amendments tied together in a fantastic "daisy
chain" arrangement under which, although the amendments were voted
on separately, if one of them lost, they all lost. Needless to say, they
all lost.' 9
The New Jersey experience was similar in one respect. Following
a series of abortive efforts at constitutional revision through more conventional procedures, the legislature in 1942 undertook the task. Its
failure to come up with an acceptable plan gave impetus to renewed
efforts to obtain a convention. 20 This goal was achieved in 1947. In
Oregon, the voters authorized the legislature by a two-thirds vote of
the membership of both houses to revise the constitution in whole or
in part, and to refer the proposed changes to the voters. This was an
interesting but not particularly successful experiment in constitution
making.
There have been a few instances in which a law institute, state bar
association or other body of comparable standing has drafted a complete constitution, but none of these efforts have met with much success. In 1950, the Connecticut Commission on State Government
18. Proposed Revision of the California Constitution. San Francisco, February 1966.
19. See Dauer, Manning, J., and Kammerer, Gladys M., Legislative Power to Revise
Constitution, Reorganization of Board of Control, and Other ConstitutionalAmendments
of 1964. Public Administration Clearing Service, University of Florida. Gainesville, 1964.
20. See The Book of the States 1964-1965, p. 8; and Bebout, John E., New Tasks for
a Legislature. National Municipal Review, v. 33, January 1944, pp. 17-21.
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Organization (an executive reorganization commission) became convinced that defects in the existing constitution were responsible for
many of the defects in the organization of the government, and that
these could be remedied only by correction of the constitutional defects
which caused them. Accordingly, a study of the constitution was
undertaken, and the text of a complete new constitution was submitted
as a part of the Commission's report.21 It was an excellent report, but
it met with resistance in the legislature. Bills were introduced calling
for a convention to draft a new instrument to be submitted to the
voters, but no action was taken.
The bar associations of California and Florida both presented draft
constitutions in 1944. The Louisiana Law Institute undertook the most
ambitious project of this type so far, turning out in 1950 a report in five
massive volumes of research material in support of the draft constitution which they proposed, but now-years later-Louisiana is still trying
to obtain a convention to revise its constitution. The experience in
Pennsylvania with the state bar association amendments now appears
to offer some hope of success. William A. Schnader who served as
Attorney General under three Governors and for a longer time than
any other man in the history of the Commonwealth has, throughout
his long period of public life, been an ardent advocate of constitutional
reform. Convinced by long years of always futile efforts to obtain a
constitutional convention that this was a hopeless quest, he headed up
during his term as President of the Pennsylvania Bar Association a
project to revise the state constitution, article by article, wrapping up
the whole revision project in a single package containing twelve constitutional amendments which, when submitted to statewide referendum
by the legislature and approved by the voters, would give the state
a completely revised and thoroughly modem constitution.
This has been an interesting and challenging approach to the solution
of an age-old problem. Pennsylvania has been trying-always unsuccessfully-to revise its ancient and outmoded century old constitution
for well over half of this period. It may, therefore, be appropriate to
summarize the current status of this undertaking. Four amendments
on the Declaration of Rights, the Legislature and Legislation and repealing a useless article on Railroads and Canals were passed for the first
21. The Report. Hartford, 1950; see also: Braden, George A., and Cahill, Fred V.,
A New Constitution for Connecticut. Connecticut Bar Journal, 1, June 1950, pp. 121181; II, September 1950, pp. 265-323.
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time in 1965, and await second passage in 1967-1968. One on Public
Officers was approved by the voters on May 17, another on Private
Corporations will be voted on this November. On July 27, three more
amendments on the Executive, Elections, and Future Amendments
completed first passage. Robert Sidman, Executive Director of a Modern Constitution for Pennsylvania, a statewide citizens organization,
reports that: 22 "To summarize, amendments to implement all of the
Pennsylvania Bar Association's 'Project Constitution' except the Judicial, Taxation and State Finance, and Local Government articles (and
three sections of the article on the Legislature having to do with legislative apportionment), are now on their way to adoption." Proposed
amendments on these remaining three Articles and the Apportionment
sections have been drafted and introduced, and may yet receive some
attention from the General Assembly in its remaining months.
The Effectiveness of a New Constitution
So much effort is now required to obtain a new constitution that all
involved are just about exhausted when the ordeal is over. This may
account for the fact that there has been so little follow-up to ascertain
how the new instrument actually works in practice. For sometime,
John E. Bebout has been urging that a serious effort be made to determine how each new constitution works, and to evaluate its effectiveness.23 Martin L. Faust did attempt this in Missouri five years after
the Convention of 1943, and again, ten years after.24 Bennett M. Rich
25
commented on this matter in his book on New Jersey Government
and had planned an evaluation ten years after. During the current year,
Albert L. Sturm, who made a special study of the Michigan Convention
of 1961-1962 while it was in session, has been engaged in a task never
before undertaken-a study of the processes of transition from the old
constitution to the new. This is an important question: What does
22. Bulletin, July 29, 1966, p. 1.
23. See his explanatory Note in the Sixth Edition of the Model State Constitution, and
an article, Recent Constitution Writing. Texas Law Review, v. 35, October 1957, pp.
1071-1089.

24. Five Years Under the New Missouri Constitution; a Progress Report. Missouri
Public Expenditure Survey, Jefferson City, 1950; and an article, Constitutional Convention in Missouri: University of Missouri Business & Government Review, v. 3, MarchApril 1962, pp. 15-24.
25. Government and Administration of New Jersey, Chapter 3. Crowell, New York,
1957.
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happen in governmental operations when the basic rules are changed?
Until the Sturm study is completed and published, no one has ever
really known.
II.

SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

It is not an easy thing to summarize in a few well chosen words the
changes that have taken place in the constitutions of fifty states in some
ten or a dozen different areas in the last quarter of a century. On the
other hand, it is not impossible to note specific changes or types of
changes occurring with sufficient frequency to be identified as trends
or probable trends. This will be attempted here in a number of major
areas: the bill of rights, the executive, legislative and judicial branches
of government, suffrage and elections, taxation and finance, local government, intergovernmental relations, amendment and revision, and
important functions or services. Since people do not necessarily think
in terms of such a classification, the problems that now seem to concern
them most, such as legislative apportionment, gubernatorial succession,
and judicial reorganization will be considered under the appropriate
heading.
The Bill of Rights
The principles underlying the fundamental rights may be eternal,
but their application varies with time, place and circumstance. Men
have always tried to write into the fundamental law guarantees of
those rights that have most recently been won and which they assume,
therefore, are most likely to be violated. As conditions change, man's
concept of what is important changes too. Rights once regarded as
essential may lose their meaning. In the early days, a citizen may have
needed a gun to protect his life, his home and his family whereas today,
the unrestricted shipment of firearms in interstate commerce, and their
easy accessibility from mail order houses in itself constitutes a danger in
a society plagued by a rising crime rate. On the other hand, other
rights unknown in a frontier society which was largely agricultural
and almost wholly rural assume major importance in a highly industrialized and urbanized society such as now exists. Thus does the right
to organize become a major concern, as does the right to freedom
from discrimination because of race, creed, color, sex or national
26

origin.

26. See the author's A New Bill of Rights? National Municipal Review, May 1957, pp.
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It is no accident, considering the great current interest in civil rights,
that significant developments have occurred in this area. But it is also
significant that these changes have tended to enlarge the concept of
civil rights, and to make these rights more meaningful in the lives of
all citizens under present day conditions. The advances that have been
made have been confined to altogether too few states, and for no reason
that is readily apparent, the greatest advances have been made in some
of the oldest states and in the newest ones.
For example, the right to organize is one of those rights still in the
process of establishment. As long as this country had an agricultural
economy, there was no problem, for farmers have always been highly
individualistic and independent people. Labor unions, labor organizers
and union membership were concepts far removed from their thinking
and experience. But in a rapidly urbanizing and industrialized society,
the unionization of workers has, in recent decades, made great progress.
The right to form unions, and to maintain membership in them is
widely recognized by law and has been upheld by the courts in a large
number of cases.
Gradually, however, the conviction grew that this was not enough.
A distinguished group of lawyers and political scientists who drafted
the Fifth Edition of the Model State Constitution in 1948 concluded
right to organize should be given
that the time had come when the 27
law:
basic
the
in
specific protection
Right to Organize. Citizens shall have the right to organize, except
in military or semi-military organizations not under the supervision
of the state, and except for purposes of resisting the duly constituted
authority of this state or of the United States.
This section goes on specifically to extend the right to organize to
employees, both public and private. This has been called the greatest
change in the Bill of Rights in American constitutions in our time.
Comparable provisions are found in the constitutions of Missouri;"8
New Jersey; 29 New York;"0 and Puerto Rico."
238-244; also his Chapter 9 in the author's symposium, Major Problems in State Constitutional Revision. Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1960.
27. Article I, Section 103. National Municipal League, New York, 1948.
28. Article I, Section 29, 1943.
29. Article I, Section 19, 1947.
30. Article I, Section 17, 1938.
31. Article II, Sections 16 and 18, 1951.
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Many state and local governments, beginning with the Ives-Quinn
Law in New York in 1945, have been active in the effort to eliminate
discrimination in employment and in other areas. Except for temporary
measures taken during World War II, these efforts preceded the Federal Government's entry into the field. Many jurisdictions followed the
lead of New York, enacting fair employment practice laws, and establishing agencies and procedures for their enforcement. Of course,
statutes enacted under general legislative powers are not to be confused
with constitutional provisions barring discrimination. But these have
not been lacking. Although they have come slowly, their number has
been gradually increasing. New Jersey led off,32 followed by Alaska, 33
Hawaii, 34 Puerto Rico,3 5 and now Connecticut.3 6 The Alaska provision reads:
Civil Rights. No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil
or political right because of race, color, creed or national origin. The
legislature shall implement this Section.
Throughout the period included in this survey, two types of questions have tended repeatedly to recur. One of these involves invasion
of the right of privacy, originally in the form of wiretapping, now
often referred to as "bugging", and including a multiplicity of electronic devices. There is a deep conflict regarding the use of these
practices. From the viewpoint of the citizen, they are clearly a violation of the right of privacy, of the age-old Anglo-Saxon principle that
a man's home is his castle. Such persons regard all of these devices and
procedures as an iniquitous practice which ought seldom, if ever, to
be condoned, while those whose chief concern is with law enforcement
believe that their use is proper when it is or when it appears to be
necessary in order to achieve the ends of justice. The New York
convention of 1938 took a strong position on this matter, sanctioning
interception of communications "only upon oath or affirnmation that
32. Article I, Section 5, 1947.
33. Article I, Section 3, 1956.

34. Article I, Sections 4 and 7, 1950.
35. Article I, Section 1, 1951.
36. Article I, Section 20, 1965.
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there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may thus
be obtained, and identifying the particular means of communication,
and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof." 17 The Puerto
Rican convention took a similar position,38 as does the new Sixth Edition of the Model State Constitution.9
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated. Wiretapping is prohibited.
The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of telephone, telegraph and other electronic means of communication [and against unreasonable interception of oral or other communications by electric or electronic methods] shall not be violated,
and no orders or warrants .... Evidence obtained in violation of this
section shall not be admissible in any court against any person.
The latter part of this period has witnessed a new emphasis on due
process for persons accused of crime. After long years of carelessness
in such matters-if not worse-in many jurisdictions, the new constitutions seek to insure their protection, as the following provisions from
the constitutions of Alaska 40 and Puerto Rico 41 clearly indicate:
The right of all persons to fair and just treatment in the course of
legislative and executive investigations shall not be infringed.
Every person has the right to the protection of law against abusive
attacks on his honor, reputation and private or family life.
These two provisions were framed in the decade of the Fifties when
the spirit of McCarthyism was riding high at both the national and
state levels. More recently, in the Sixties, the emphasis has shifted to
due process in judicial procedure. This important development is il42
lustrated by a new provision in the Model State Constitution:
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial,.., to have compulsory process for obtain37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Article I, Section 12, 1938.
Article 11, Section 10, 1951.
Article I, Section 103.
Article I, Section 7, 1956.
Article II, Section 8, 1951.
Article I, Section 1.06.
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ing witnesses in his favor, to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense, and to the assignment of counsel to represent him at every
stage of the proceedings unless he elects to proceed without counsel
or is able to obtain counsel ...
(b) All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, but bail may be denied to persons charged with capital offenses or offenses punishable by life imprisonment, giving due weight
to the evidence and to the nature and circumstances of the event...
This development raises some significant questions discussed elsewhere
in this volume, such as the extent to which the Federal Bill of Rights
has been "read into" the state constitutions, strengthening and supplementing their provisions in some instances, superseding them in others,
and the role of the Supreme Court in establishing and enforcing procedural standards in this field. The latter especially has generated a
bitter controversy which is now raging between those dedicated to
civil rights and those whose major interest lies in the field of law
enforcement.
The Executive
As in other major areas in a period when constitutional conventions
for general revision were few in number and difficult to create, supporters of change in the executive branch have been obliged to rely
chiefly upon amendments to accomplish individual changes, most of
which are designed to strengthen the position of the governor. Many
of these have been recommended for years by students of state government, such as lengthening the term of the governor, electing the
governor and lieutenant governor as a team, removing (or at least
easing) limitations on reeligibility, establishing the short ballot principle so that executive responsibility would not be divided among so
many elective officers, forbidding the legislature to include both appropriations and substantive provisions in the same piece of legislation,
broadening the governor's veto power to include reduction as well as
the deletion of items, giving the governor the power to initiate reorganization, requiring a two-thirds vote rather than a simple majority
to override a veto.
Even when a convention does meet, the traditional conservatism of
such bodies may operate, as it did in the Connecticut Convention of
1965, to hold accomplishment to a minimum. All of these proposals,
as well as others, were considered in this convention, but only the last

22
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one was adopted, and this was "linked with another change to allow
the legislature to have a veto-reviewing session after the end of regular
sessions when governors have frequently" made extensive use of their
4
veto powers. 1
That some of these proposals are making real progress by the piecemeal amendment procedures, there can be no doubt. In the last biennium, four states completed action on amendments to lengthen the
terms of elective officers-a change which Michigan had accompanied
in its 1961-1962 Convention. The move in this direction is under way
in other jurisdictions. In 1950, the governor had a four-year term in
twenty-five states, a two-year term in twenty-one. Now the figures
are thirty-six and fourteen, respectively. Restrictions on reeligibility
are gradually being eased. In Missouri just last year, the voters approved an amendment permitting the governor to succeed himself, and
last month, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania approved a similar
proposal for submission to the electorate. There are now thirty states
with no limitation on the number of consecutive terms, and other states
are moving in this direction.
Constitutional salaries and salary limitations are gradually disappearing, and by legislative action, salaries are being raised to bring them
in line with present day standards. The problems of continuity in government in case of enemy attack and gubernatorial succession continue
to receive attention. Provisions designed to serve the twofold purpose
of strengthening party responsibility and the position of the governor
by requiring the governor and lieutenant governor to run as a team
have been adopted in six states between 1953 and 1964, in five by
constitutional amendment, in one by statute. Hawaii had accomplished
this in its 1950 Convention, Michigan in its Convention of 1961-1962.
44
The proposal is now being considered in other states.
For sometime, an effort has been made to discover some type of
machinery that would at the same time hold within reasonable limits
the number of executive departments and entrust the executive with
the responsibility for maintaining an orderly administrative structure,
subject to legislative review. Most constitutions within the period under
review (except Georgia, and now Connecticut) contain a limitation
43. Bosworth, Karl A., 1965 Constitutional Convention: Its Policies and Issues, p. 4.
Connecticut Govermnent, v. 19, March 1966.
44. Bell, George A., State Administrative Organization and Management, 1964-65,
in The Book of the States, 1966-67, pp. 127-130. Council of State Governments, Chicago,
1966.
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on the number of executive departments. New York and Missouri both
make the mistake of freezing specific departments into the constitution.
The final responsibility for executive organization lies with the legislature in New Jersey and New York, while in Missouri and the Model
State Constitution, the executive is given an important responsibility.
The Governor of Missouri was given power to regroup seventy agencies into ten executive departments, with the legislature authorized to
create five more bureaus subject to assignment to the appropriate department by the Governor. In Michigan, the chief executive was required to consolidate the more than 120 boards, commissions and other
agencies into no more than twenty executive departments. A similar
provision was contained in the Oregon Commission's draft which failed
of adoption. In the post-Convention reorganization in New Jersey, the
Governor assumed leadership in this area, not by reason of any specific
constitutional mandate but rather because of his duty of making recommendations to the legislature.
It is not necessary, nor does space permit detailed comment on all
the things that are now being done in this area. Enough has been said
to make two points quite clear, namely, that there is a definite trend
to adopt specific changes designed to strengthen the position of the
governor, and that these individual changes can be and are being
accomplished by judicious use of the piecemeal amending procedures.
The Legislature
There is actually little to report here on susbtantive changes affecting
the legislature. Although Nebraska's unicameral amendment, adopted
in 1934 and effective in 1937, attracted wide attention, and prompted
the introduction of similar proposals in many states, only a few of these
were accorded serious consideration and none were adopted. Recent
constitutional conventions in Michigan and Rhode Island considered
the proposal, but neither saw fit to adopt it.
There have been few modifications of legislature powers. On this
point, Professor Bosworth makes some interesting comments on the
work of the Connecticut Convention of 1965:45
.....
while making the required changes in the legislature, [the
Convention] could have undertaken many dubious changes and frozen
in the Constitution many doctrines. Instead, from this vantage point
45. Op. cit., p. 8.
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it appears that the Convention didn't harm the old document much
and did make a number of improvements. The Constitution of 1965
is still short and generally clear in meaning, with the legislature still
possessing most of the powers of government.
It would appear that what happened in Connecticut was not much
different from what has been happening in other states. The truth of
the matter is that, aside from apportionment which has been and seems
likely to continue to be a crucial issue-politically, at least-most of the
problems confronting the legislatures are not constitutional problems.
They are problems of organization and procedure, so completely within
the province of legislative powers that they can be taken care of by
changes in the rules, by statute, or by the voting of additional funds
for higher salaries, more and better staffing, and better offices and facilities for work.
Apportionment has been and still is a major issue affecting the legislative branch, and the critical questions here have to do with apportionment standards and procedures. These are important policy matters
that are clearly constitutional in nature. They were major questions
before the Conventions in Connecticut and Rhode Island, and it appears
certain that they will be in New York. All of these are unlimited conventions, while the pending convention in New Jersey has been conceived solely for the purpose of dealing with the apportionment
problem.
The application of these standards and procedures, once they have
been determined, in establishing the pattern of legislative districts, is
a legislative responsibility which has no proper place in the Constitution. While this problem may now be classified politically as a "hot
potato", it appears likely that the political hazards currently attached
to it may be lessened or perhaps even eliminated with the passage of
time, or when computers take over the job-a possibility that is not at
all unlikely.
A third problem arises from the long recognized lack of confidence
in elected representative assemblies, which has in the past expressed
itself in innumerable limitations and restrictions on the exercise of legislative power. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of some legislatures to improve their public image by improving their performance,
and of such organizations as the National Legislative Conference and
the Conference of Legislative Leaders, the lack of confidence is still
apparent, expressing itself in a variety of efforts to make specific actions
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mandatory or to make the constitutional provisions regarding them

self-executing (or automatic) as in the case of some plans for achieving
apportionment in case the legislature fails to discharge its responsibility.
Such efforts are rarely successful, and their effect in further undermining the prestige of the legislature by suggesting that it is likely to
fail, is an unfortunate one at a time when the need is to strengthen, not
weaken, the position of the legislature. The point is often made that
many states which bemoan their loss of power to the Federal Government still cling to constitutional limitations which cripple their own

legislatures. The author has discussed some of these problems else46

where.
The individual changes may not at first appear to be of momentous
significance, but collectively they reveal a lack of confidence in and
respect for the legislative prerogative. They show a tendency to undermine rather than to strengthen the legislative branch of government,
and this in spite of the fact that it is generally recognized that these
restrictive provisions have been excessive in number and most unfortunate in their effects. The task of the legislature-difficult enough
under the most favorable circumstances-has been made more difficult
than it would otherwise be, and needlessly so. Yet the old restrictions
are difficult to remove and new ones continue to appear. Many of
them are of a positive character, in the form of mandates. Others, such
as self-executing provisions impose restrictions by implication. Provisions dedicating revenues, by imposing unwarranted and improper
restrictions upon legislative control of the purse, at the same time make
a mockery of the budgetary process. Yet provisions of these types
continue in effect or even to multiply long years after well informed
people have recognized that from a public policy viewpoint, they are
unwise.
Charles W. Shull has written, "Consideration should be given to the
reconstitution of state legislative bodies as effective elements in the entire process of state government." 47 There is little evidence that this
is being done. "Highly restricted and limited in many ways, state
lawmaking assemblies have not been geared to cope with the growing
complexities of modem legislation. They have exhibited tendencies
at times to obstruct or to insist upon privileges and status rightly or
46. Concepts of Legislative Power in State Constitutions. Louisiana Law Review,
v. 14, June 1954, pp. 749-763.
47. Chapter 12 in the author's Major Problems in State Constitutional Revision. Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1960.
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wrongly conceived. On occasion, they seem to have assumed they were
the entire government."
"State legislatures," he continues, "need to be reformed and reshaped
so that the legislative power is more fully vested in one body-though
not necessarily in one house. Control of the purse should be vested
more clearly and securely in the legislature; constitutional provisions
that, in effect, make appropriations should be eliminated. The horizons
of the American state legislatures can be widened by sound constitutional treatment, and such treatment will provide one for their future."

The Judiciary
The New Jersey Constitution of 1947 provided for a thorough revision of the entire judicial structure of the state. This was not only the
first in New Jersey for a century but the first major reorganization
of the courts in any state for a very long time. Of this transformation,
it was said that it brought the state from a position of having probably
the worst judicial system in the country to that of having what was
then the best and still is one of the best. Although organizations like
the American Judicature Society, the American Bar Association, the
National Municipal League, and others have been working for judicial reorganization for years, progress was, until very recently, so slow
as to be virtually imperceptible. Now, there is an increasing number
of states in which judicial reorganization is an accomplished factColorado, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Puerto Rico. Other reorganizations are in progress. One of the most
interesting aspects of this movement has been the fact that Missouri,
New Jersey and Puerto Rico have been the only jurisdictions to achieve
judicial reorganization by the constitutional convention procedure. All
the rest have been accomplished through the adoption of constitutional
amendments, following a long period of study and popular education.
Extensive studies, embracing organization, procedure and general performance, have been made in some cases by existing agencies (the Legislative Council in Colorado, 48 the state bar association, or by a special
legislative investigating committee (Tweed Commission in New
York). The amendments, while they are as different as the states which
adopted them, were similar in one respect: each establishes, or at
48. See Shannon, Daniel J., Judicial Reform for Colorado Courts of Special Jurisdiction. Judicature, v. 50, June-July 1966, pp. 16-22.
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least moves toward acceptance of basic concepts of judicial organiza49
tion repeatedly recommended over a period of years.
First among these is a unified court system. The need for a central
administration for the court system is recognized, this function being
assigned either to the chief justice or to an administrative officer. There
is evident a tendency toward higher qualifications for judges in the
lower courts, to require full time service on a salary basis, to eliminate
the fee system, and-unbelievable though it may seem-to abolish the
justices of the peace, a goal that has now been accomplished in a number of jurisdictions. In every case, a serious effort is made in the amendment and in the supporting legislation to unify the court system, to
simplify the judicial structure, to streamline judicial procedure and to
make the courts more responsive to present day needs.

Suffrage and Elections
Under normal circumstances, this is not a very active field in constitution making. There was a flurry of activity early in the World
War II period, in an effort to make the suffrage available to the men
and women in the Armed Services. As late as 1948, one observer noted
that "few changes of any importance have been made in this area in
recent years." 60 In 1945, Georgia made two significant changes which
indicated a line for future development-reducing the minimum age for
voting to eighteen years and eliminating the poll tax as a requirement
for voting. As usual, the states responded slowly. So far only four have
established a minimum voting age at less than twenty-one. Kentucky
joined Georgia in adopting the eighteen year qualification, Alaska
adopted nineteen years, and Hawaii twenty. The Twenty-fourth
Amendment-the poll tax amendment, effective in January 1964-outlawed poll taxes as a qualification for voting in the five states that had
still retained this requirement. Three of these, Arkansas, Texas and
Virginia, had abolished the tax as a voting prerequisite before the
Amendment had received the required number of ratifications.

Taxation and Finance
A number of factors have contributed to the great expansion in state
49. See Aumann, Francis R., The Judiciary, Chapter 13 in the author's Major Problemns, op. cit.; also Wheeler, John P., Ed, Salient Issues of Constitutional Revision.
National Municipal League, New York, 1961.
50. Short, Lloyd M., in a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Chicago, December 28, 1948.
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and local governments, and, thereby, to the critical financial problems
with which these governments are now and have been confronted.
These problems have been met in part by tremendous increases in Federal grants-in-aid, and in part by the adoption of new broadbase taxes
or increased rates for existing sales and income taxes. In addition, it has
been necessary for the states to abolish long outmoded restrictions on
the incurring of debt or the adoption of amendments authorizing bond
issues for specific purposes-a procedure often necessitated by state
constitutional restrictions against the incurring of indebtedness for
capital expenditures. Although a great many of these problems are
more statutory matters than constitutional, the constitutional changes
have not only been very numerous, but actually more numerous than
in any other single field. 51 It is significant, too, that the provisions
adopted in any given jurisdiction were often not only lacking in consistency but might have exactly opposite effects.
Despite the obvious and generally recognized objections to a system
of dedicated revenues, the states go merrily on placing constitutional
restrictions on the power of legislatures to raise and spend revenues
from taxes or from other sources. In a number of jurisdictions, this
situation has become so bad that the legislature has effective appropriation control over only a small fractional part of the total state revenues.
Even in recent years, many states have adopted constitutional amendments imposing taxes on motor vehicles and their fuels and dedicating
the receipts therefrom to highway purposes. This action promoted by
the automobile clubs, truck and bus operators, and the highway building industry is but a conspicuous example of a trend evident in many
quarters to regard any taxes, licenses or fees paid into the public treasury by the members of any organized group as their own property to
be used only for purposes beneficial to them. This applies to bank
taxes, licenses and fees paid by sportsmen, members of the professions,
and many others. The automobile lobby now brags that revenues from
motor vehicle and highway user taxes are now "untouchable" in many
states. Similarly, revenues from hunting and fishing licenses have long
been dedicated in many states. California and Missouri, justifying their
action by Federal grant-in-aid programs, dedicated such receipts to
conservation purposes. Missouri also adopted a one mill levy on general property for the State Park Fund.
51. See the author's chapter on The Use of the Amending Procedure Since World
War II, in his Major Problems on State ConstitutionalRevision. Public Administration
Service, Chicago, 1960.
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step in the opposite
Only one state, Georgia, has taken a noteworthy
2
direction by adopting a section which provides:
All money raised from taxes, fees, and assessments for State purposes
.. . shall be paid into the General Fund of the State Treasury and

shall be appropriated therefrom, as required by this Constitution, for
the purposes set out in this Section and for these purposes only.
In another section the revised Georgia Constitution provides that appropriations must be made to agencies in specific sums and not the
revenue of a certain tax. A somewhat similar provision was proposed
by the Taxation and Finance Committee of the Minnesota Constitutional Commission; it received considerable public support but was
rejected by the full Commission by a close vote. This state did move
a step in this direction, however, when in 1944 an amendment was
adopted authorizing special taxes on aircraft fuels without dedicating
the revenues derived therefrom, as had been done in 1920 in an amendment for highway purposes.
Mention has been made of contradictory provisions. In the early
years of the period under review, this was especially true with respect
to tax exemptions. While the mounting valuation of exempt property was prompting the states to restrict exemptions accorded to religious, charitable and educational institutions to property used exclusively for such purposes, they were authorizing new exemptions (some
mandatory, some optional) for such purposes as rural electrification
cooperatives (Georgia), slum clearance and redevelopment projects
(New Jersey), lands being reforested (Missouri and Virginia), new
industries for a period of years (Arkansas), and preferences for veterans (Alabama, Arkansas, New Jersey, Texas and Virginia). Georgia
alone moved toward reform by nullifying all tax exemptions previously
granted in corporate charters.
Overall tax limitations continued to appear, as in Georgia and Washington. Missouri specifically authorized the classification of property
for purposes of taxation, while Florida and Oklahoma prohibited ad
valorem taxes for state purposes.
Changes in the debt provisions in New York were designed to give
the legislature greater freedom in decision making on the incurring
of new debt, but with very specific provisions for the payment of
principal and interest on such indebtedness within a limited period.
52. Article VII, Section 2, Paragraph 3.
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New Jersey placed a limit upon general indebtedness at 1 per cent of
the total amount appropriated by general appropriation law for that
fiscal year. Beyond that point, indebtedness could be incurred only by
special act restricted to a single purpose and approved by popular vote.
Pennsylvania reversed long-standing practice when it specifically authorized incurring indebtedness for capital improvements. A similar
provision in Wisconsin led the Supreme Court of that state to hold
unconstitutional a provision for veteran housing; this was later reversed
when a state constitutional amendment authorizing such preference was
submitted to and approved by the voters.
In 1945, Michigan adopted an amendment extending the list of works
for internal improvement previously published, in which the state might
participate. The voters have shown a considerable willingness to accept
such proposals, as illustrated by an Oregon provision for loans to veterans for home construction and farm purchase, Minnesota and Wisconsin provisions for state aeronautics projects, and a Wyoming amendment for conservation and water projects. These actions suggest the
reasonableness of the Pennsylvania proposal, although the Minnesota
Commission-as noted-rejected a similar proposal. During these years,
several amendments were adopted providing for new taxes or increasing old ones, containing specific provisions (as in Michigan and Oregon) for the sharing of the proceeds with local governments.

Local Goverinment
Second only to the field of taxation and finance in the number and
significance of substantive changes in state constitutions in the early
years of the period under review was the field of local government.
But, here also, there was evidence of contradictory trends. While state
governments were authorized to impose tax and debt limits on local
governments, as in New York, to require annual budgets as in Missouri
(and other states), they were authorized to enact general legislation
applicable to all local governments or to those in certain classes determined by state legislative action, the principle of local self government was extended by constitutional amendments providing for county
as well as municipal home rule, optional charters (New Jersey), county manager government, to levy taxes and issue bonds for certain
approved purposes. Further restrictions on special legislation were
imposed. One of the most far-reaching constitutional provisions relating to local government, obviously designed to strengthen the con-
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stitutional position of the cities and counties, is found in the New Jersey Constitution:5
The provisions of this Constitution and of any law concerning
municipal corporations formed for local government or concerning
counties, shall be liberally construed in their favor. The powers of
counties and such municipal corporations shall include not only those
granted in express terms but also those of necessary or fair implication, or incident to the powers expressly conferred, or essential
thereto, and not inconsistent with or prohibited by this Constitution
or by law.
Attempts at improving local government are to be noted in the provisions of the Missouri Constitution extending home rule to cities and
counties, county consolidation or dissolution, joint performance of
certain governmental functions, and contractual arrangements between
counties; the Georgia provision for county consolidation and a prohibition on the formation of new counties except by the process of
consolidation; and the Oregon provision for county manager government.
As a matter of fact, home rule, so called, constitutes one of the'
governmental enigmas of our time. While on the one hand, local
government people continue to clamor for more home rule of the
conventional variety, a rapidly urbanizing country suffers acutely from
an excess of home rule-an excess which has resulted in an absolutely
indefensible number of local units, each so jealous of its autonomy and
prerogatives that, in many metropolitan areas, something approaching
governmental chaos results. These units show, in many cases, little disposition to cooperate and even less to consolidate, so that uniform policies
may be agreed upon and enforced on an areawide basis. Although the
elimination of many of these units has been repeatedly recommended,
most recently by the Committee for Economic Development, 4 there
seems to be little likelihood that while present attitudes prevail, much
will be accomplished. Certainly there is little basis for hope from anything that has happened recently in the field of constitutional change.
53. Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 11; Michigan has a very similar provision, Article
VIII, Section 4.
54. Modernizing Local Government. New York, 1966.
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Intergovernmental Relations
Important though they were, intergovernmental relations received
scant attention until very recently. Now, in view of the mounting
interest in them and their importance in modern American Government, no survey of constitutional developments during this quarter of
a century could properly ignore them. Although it has been pretty well
established that constitutional authorization for cooperative action between and among the different units and levels of government are not
really necessary, 55 a number of states have included such provisions in
new constitutions, or added them to old ones by amendment.
There are provisions in the Model State Constitution, and in the
constitutions of Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan and Missouri authorizing
general interlevel and interjurisdictional cooperation. 56 The Hawaiian
Constitution uses this language: "The legislature may provide for
cooperation of state and political subdivisions with the United States,
other states or their subdivisions, in matters affecting public health,
safety and general welfare." Hawaii and Louisiana particularly emphasize Federal-State cooperation, as the above language indicates, the
former in health and welfare, the latter in reclamation, 57 while Nevada
has a provision for interstate compacts in the conservation field.5 8 The
number of constitutional amendments proposed in the intergovernmental field in an eleven-year period (1946-1956) was not great; twothirds of these were approved by the voters, one-third rejected. 59
Most of the proposals in the Federal-State and State-Local relations
areas dealt with fiscal matters. Of those involving interstate relations,
two dealt with boundary questions, two with ratification of interstate
compacts, and one with a purely statutory matter. Many of the states
that have home rule have established it by constitutional provision.
Many of the states that have home rule have established it by constitutional provision. An idea now winning increasing acceptance-establishment of an office or agency on intergovernmental releations is, in
some jurisdictions established by constitutional provision. The Alaska
55. See Zimmerman, Frederick L., and Wendell, Mitchell, No Positive Barriers. National Civic Review, v. 48, November 1959, pp. 522-525, 554, and Wiltsee, Herbert L., and
Wendell, Mitchell, Chapter 16 in the author's Major Problems in State Constitutional
Revision. Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1960.

56. Alaska, Article XII, Section 2; Hawaii, Article XIV, Section 5; Michigan, Article
III, Section 5; and Missouri, Article XVI.
57. Article XIV, Section 5, and Article IX, Section 3, respectively.

58. Article IX, Section 3.
59. See the author's Use of the Amending Procedure Since World War II, op. cit.
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Constitution provides for such an Office."0 Since any state legislature
has the power to establish such an office, constitutional provision for it
is not only unnecessary but probably unwise. The same may be said
of constitutional authorization for interlocal cooperation, although four
state constitutions make specific provision for such cooperation. 61

Amendment and Revision
There is some evidence of increased interest in the processes by
which constitutional changes become possible. It may be that the
widely publicized difficulties of Illinois and its famous Gateway
Amendment contributed to this interest.62 The Illinois experience, how-

ever, was certainly not unique. Connecticut, Kentucky, and Michigan,
and possibly other states were confronted with a similar situation. It
is obviously a serious matter when it becomes necessary to amend
the amending process before other needed changes in the constitution

can be made. The provisions on other aspects of the amending procedure in the six most recent constitutions include for most of the
states involved: 63 (1) a two-thirds vote for proposal of amendments by
the legislature; (2) a majority of those voting on the amendments in the

popular referendum; (3) provision for constitutional initiative in two
jurisdictions only; (4) mandatory periodic referendum on question of
holding a constitutional convention required in four; (5) mandatory
submission of convention proposals to the voters in all six; (6) the

popular vote required to call a constitutional convention is a majority
of those voting on the question in all six; (7) similarly, a majority of
those voting on the question is sufficient for ratification of convention
proposals. The Model State Constitution has a requirement for preparatory research before a convention, and Alaska forbids the holding
of limited constitutional convention.
60. Article X, Section 14. The old Pennsylvania Bureau of Municipal Affairs was in
a constitutional department (Department of Internal Affairs), but the new Department
of Community Affairs was created by statute in 1965. Senate Bill No. 1144, 1965.
61. See the author's American Intergovernmental Relations, Chapter 20. Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1964.
62. For the story of its adoption, see The Book of the States, 1952-1953, p. 62; on its
effects, 1954-1955, p. 66, and 1956-1957, pp. 68-69.
63. Based on Dickson, David F., and others, Comparison of Selected Features of Six
Recent Constitutions and the Florida Constitution: a Tabular Analysis. Institute for
Governmental Research, Florida State University. Tallahassee, March 1966.
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Health, Education, Welfare and Other Functions
Everyone who works on state constitutions sooner or later comes
face to face with the question: What, if anything, does one do constitutionally with the major functions of government which, together,
account for the bulk of all state expenditures? Since these are matters
which clearly fall within the scope of legislative power, it seems pretty
clear that a minimum amount of space should be accorded them in
the constitution. Yet, at the same time, one hesitates to omit them
entirely, lest such omission be interpreted as evidence of a lack of interest on the part of the framers, or be used as a basis for prejudicial
treatment of these functions. The Fifth Edition of the Model State
Constitution solved the problem by a simple declaration that:
Section 1007. Powers of the State. The enumeration in this article
of specified functions shall not be construed as a limitation upon the
powers of the state government. The state government shall have full
power to act for the government and good order of the state and for
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, by all necessary and
convenient means, subject only to the limitations prescribed in this
constitution and in the Constitution of the United States.
Other constitution framers have been more specific. On what basis
does one select one for special mention and exclude all others, and having selected one-education, for example-then proceed to elaborate on
both the public schools and higher education? All but one of the six
most recent constitutions has a separate article on education, and all
provide for free public schools. Two states (Alaska and Hawaii) have
separate articles on health, education and welfare and on conservation
and the development of natural resources.
III. A

CHALLENGE AND AN OPPORTUNITY

The Concept of Continuous Revision
For a great many years, there have been occasional expressions of
interest in the concept of continuous revision, but little serious effort
has been made to implement such a policy and make it effective. The
earliest interest in the idea known to the writer occurred in Pennsylvania whose Constitution of 1776 provided for a Council of Censors
of thirteen members, popularly elected every seven years, for the dual
purpose of examining the actions of both the executive and the As-
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sembly, and of proposing amendments to the state constitution at regular intervals. Although the idea seems to be fundamentally sound, it
was found that in practice, the Council so restricted the powers of the
Governor that it was soon abandoned. Other states borrowed the device, but for present purposes, the experience of Vermont which used
this method of constitutional amendment from 1777 to 1870 is most
significant. Thirteen different Councils of Censors were chosen during
the ninety-two years the plan was in effect. Three made no proposals
for amendment. An excellent study of Vermont state government, just
published, 64 reports that the ten which did
meet in txvo or three sessions of several days each, at which time they
carefully investigated the government of the state and the work of
each branch. The records of these sessions show meticulous attention
to the problems of government, as seen by the Councils. Several of
their "Addresses" to the people are state papers of value, showing a
clear perception of political issues and an understanding of political
thought that deserves high praise. These recurring bodies of thirteen
men represented the best political thinking of the state, their chief
weakness being that they were usually many years ahead of their
time. Had they been accepted, Vermont would have remained as
progressive as in the 1770's.
Every Council of Censors which proposed amendments called a constitutional convention to consider these amendments. Only twice did
a convention accept major innovations, one the shift from a unicameral
to a bicameral legislature, the other a change in the method of constitutional amendment. When the Council was abolished, the duty
was assigned to the Senate which has consistently failed to function in
this capacity.
Although this experience was, by no means, an entirely negative one,
there was no further consideration of the idea of continuous revision
until about ten years ago, when the concept was revived. In Kentucky,
a Constitution Review Commission was given statutory status, so that
it might operate on a continuing basis. In Texas, a Citizen Advisory
Committee, with the State Legislative Council as its designated research
agency, proposed the establishment of "a permanent Constitutional
Commission, which would make continuing studies on the effectivity
64. Nuquist, Andrew E., and Edith W, Vermont State Government and Administration, pp. 30-49. Bureau of Government Research, University of Vermont. Burlington,
1966.
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of the Constitution and periodically report to the legislature and the
people of Texas on its findings." 65 In Massachusetts, a proposal for
the establishment of a continuing commission is now pending.66
Briefly stated, the philosophy of the movement for continuous revision is that, in practice, neither periodic revision nor use of the piecemeal amending procedure has been able to accomplish the objective
of keeping the state's basic law updated. While in all about us, change
abounds, government alone has seemed to remain stationary, quite unresponsive to the currents of change in evidence in other aspects of
community life. General revisions have been infrequent, and difficult
if not impossible to obtain, while social, political, economic and technological changes were continuing at an accelerated pace.
In North Carolina a few years ago, the very dubious claim was
made that, by adopting some 125 amendments affecting the content of
all but one article of the Constitution in the last ninety years, continuous revision had, in fact, been achieved." The difficulty is not, in
North Carolina or in most other states, that the state constitutions are
not amended. They are; in fact, they are amended too much and often
in the wrong ways. In 1964, the existing state constitutions had been
modified to the tune of some 3,718 times-South Carolina with 250,
California with 350, Louisiana with 439-to cite a few of the worst
offenders. The constitutions of Alabama, Florida, New Hampshire,
New York, Oregon, South Carolina and Texas had each been amended
over ninety times. The average number of amendments for each state
was seventy-eight.
Not only is the number excessive beyond all reason, but the content
of the amendments themselves is of such a haphazard and miscellaneous
character as to bear no relation to any program for the orderly revision
and updating of the constitution. Most of the amendments deal with
local matters, often in individual subdivisions. Many are needed only
because quantities of statutory provisions have been permitted to become a part of the constitution. To call such a process constitutional
revision in any meaningful sense is simply to ignore the facts.
As applied in New York, the idea of continuous revision had a quite
different connotation. Confronted by the same situation that had de65. Interim Report, p. 57. Austin, March 1959.
66. Legislative Research Council, Report Relative to Constitutional Revision Procedure. Senate No. 845. Boston, March 1966.
67. See Gardner, Dillard S., The Continuous Revision of Our State Constitution.
North Carolina Law Review, April 1958, pp. 297-313.
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veloped in Kentucky-popular rejection of a proposal to call a constitutional convention-the state legislative leaders seized upon this concept as a means of guiding and giving momentum to the kind of continuous revision that would make the Constitution "more responsive
to the needs of modern life." For this purpose, they established a Special Legislative Commission on the Revision and Simplification of the
Constitution (they might have started with the name of the Commission!), which did some excellent work, and in the end, accomplished a
good deal. The Commission filed two reports, the first of which proposed a thorough revision of three articles of the Constitution. Taken
together, these revisions which were, in time adopted, accomplished
an 18 percent reduction in the wordage of the document. With the
submission of the second report, the Commission completed its assigned
task of proposing revision and simplification of the Constitution, an
accomplishment to which informed persons gave enthusiastic approval.
The Committee on Law Reform characterized it as "a unique and
signal service to the people of the State," while the New York Times
expressed editorially its "greatest admiration for the work the Peck
Commission is doing and has done, work that is being watched as a
model by other states sadly needing the same simplification." Is At the
same time, the editorial expressed the view that still more accomplishment was possible: "A line-by-line examination of the new constitutional text suggests, however, that still further abbreviation through
deletion of useless words is feasible and desirable. A good newspaper
copyreader ought to be seated beside the lawyers."
In New York, all seemed to be going well until the leadership began
to have qualms about spending tax revenues in preparation for a constitutional convention that the electorate had said that it did not want,
and cut off further financial support for the Commission. Many of the
Commission's recommendations were favorably considered by the Legislature, placed on the ballot and approved by the electorate. It was
estimated that no less than 4,000 words were by this process deleted
from the Constitution.
In this connection, the experience of Minnesota is also worth noting.
In this state, a Constitutional Commission turned in its report with
recommendations. While these were not immediately acted upon, they
68. The State Constitution, February 27, 1961.
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were not abandoned or forgotten, for during the ensuing decade, many
of them were considered and adopted.6 9 As a result of these amendments, it is reported, the Governor and the judiciary have been
strengthened. Municipalities have home rule, and other local units
live in a more congenial constitutional climate than formerly existed;
other Commission proposals are still pending. Professor Mitau, while
pleased that change is no longer impossible, expressed the fear that the
increased willingness among legislators and the public to support these
proposals may be motivated less by enthusiasm for reform per se than
by a fear that otherwise a constitutional convention-the most drastic
alternative hovering in the background of Minnesota politics-might be
forced upon them.
Revision Now
In spite of these encouraging bits of evidence from a few states,
overall accomplishments, when measured against the magnitude of the
need, are meagre indeed. While the need for constitutional modernization has been steadily increasing during recent decades, progress by
any method has moved at a snail's pace. Continuous revision has yet to
demonstrate its effectiveness. Only two comprehensive revisions by
commission have been accomplished since 1929. In the quarter century
between 1940 (or 1938, to be exact) and 1965, conventions making
comprehensive revisions were held in only four states-New York
(1938), Missouri (1943), New Jersey (1947), and Michigan (1962).
Conventions to frame new constitutions were held in three territories:
Hawaii (1950), Puerto Rico (1951), and Alaska (1955). Two of these
territories have since become states, the third a commonwealth.
But the pace is accelerating a little. New Hampshire held an unlimited constitutional convention in 1964, Connecticut and Rhode Island in 1966. As a result, amendments have been passed in New
Hampshire that mark some progress toward the modernization of its
constitution, and Connecticut has in effect already its first new constitution since 1818. A convention is definitely scheduled for New
York in 1967. In Idaho and Maryland where revisory or preparatory
commissions have been hard at work, conventions now appear to be
highly probable. The Maryland referendum was held this fall. The
69. See Mitan, G. Theodore, Constitutional Change by Amendment: Recommendations of the Minnesota Commission in Ten Year Perspective. Minnesota Law Resdew,
January 1960, pp. 461-483.
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West Virginia legislature, on the last day of its 1965 session, authorized

a referendum this fall. A preparatory Revision Assembly is meeting
periodically in Kentucky, and it is reported that the prospects look
good. There are revision movements at various stages of development
in a number of other states.
The chances are that most really serious efforts for .revision will be
undertaken by convention or commission, chiefly by the former. In
the light of this conclusion, it is not inappropriate to raise the question
as to what the function of such a body ought to be, and how they
might best proceed to accomplish it. One obvious answer is for the
several committees to concentrate on a careful review of those articles
or sections of the constitution assigned to them, with a view to accomplishing several objectives: (1) eliminating provisions that are no
longer suitable, that are largely legislative in character, or that areor conceivably might constitute-a barrier to effective governmental
action; (2) examining the phraseology of provisions to be retained; or
(3) identify points at which new provisions are needed to meet new
problems arising from changed conditions.
Here, the point may be stressed that all this is necessary and proper.
It has to be done, to be sure, but this is not the whole job, or even the
most important part of it. Some consideration should be given to the
problem of the condition in which the states now find themselves. Some
of the current literature is beginning to show an awareness of the fact
that all is not well with the states. In fact, a short time ago, two
political scientists from Michigan State University began an article with
the simple declaration: "State government is sick." 70
Evidence has been acccumulating for sometime that this is true. It
comes to light in quite unexpected ways. In the summer of 1966, at the
time of the Governors' Conference in Los Angeles, the columnists all
sensed that something was wrong, their stories appearing under such
headlines as these:
The Governors Seem Out of the Mainstream
David S. Broder, New York Times, July 10.
70. See Adrian, Charles R, and Press, Charles, Why Our State Governments Are
Sick. Antiocb Review, v. 24, Summer 1964, pp. 149-165. Also: Reichley, James, States
in Crisis, Politics in Ten American States, 1950-1962. University of North Carolina
Press, Chapel Hill, 1964, and the forthcoming report of former Governor Terry Sanford's project, A Study of the American State. For another interesting analysis, see
Armbrister, Trevor, The Octopus in the State House. Saturday Evening Post, February
12, 1966, pp. 25-29, 80.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:1

The Declining Governors
Roscoe Drummond, Washington Post, July 8.
Governors Doubt Own Usefulness
Paul Hope, Washington Evening Star, July 11.
But, if it is true that the states are sick, what is the nature of their
illness? What can be done about it? And what difference does it make,
anyway? One could write at length on these questions, as many have.
The comments here will be limited to the subject of this paper, the
state constitutions.
There are many factors contributing to the present plight of the
states. Some are not the fault of the states, being inherent in the state
system as it functions under present day conditions. Others are clearly
due to the inability or unwillingness-or both-of the states to respond
in any effective way to current governmental needs. For these failures,
the states cannot escape responsibility; in fact, it is very often the states
who are their own worst enemy. Conspicuous among their failures is
their failure to revise and modernize their constitutions.
On this point, there appears to be general agreement among informed people. It has been emphasized repeatedly "that, with few
exceptions, our states are attempting to provide governmental services
under Twentieth century conditions, under the outmoded and hampering restrictions which abound in Eighteenth and Nineteenth century
constitutions."
A decade ago, the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(Kestnbaum) found "a very real and pressing need for the states to
improve their constitutions," and urged that this was "a first step in the
program to achieve the flexibility required to meet the modern needs
of their citizens." This problem has been recognized by the Governors' Conference as a pressing one, because existing constitutional
limitations impede their progress in some matters, prevent the taking
of effective action with regard to others. The Eighth American Assembly recommended in 1958 that "those states which have not already
done so should take steps to secure a modernized, short, basic state
constitution; further, that in every state citizens be given the right to
call constitutional conventions at periodic intervals."
Not only is constitutional modernization desirable in the decade of
the Sixties, it is imperative. The need is urgent and it is immediate.
As Robert S. Steadman said in a memorandum that came recently to
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my attention, "It is my conviction that the substantive failures of so

many state governments are directly related to structural defects found
in all three branches, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial."

The main task of such a body, however, is to envision a state constitution for an expanding future-Justice Cardozo's phrase was "to
state principle of government for an expanding future." This is not
easy, because in the first place, there are limits to what can be done
constitutionally to solve or facilitate the solution of current problems,
or those that are foreseeable for the future. But there is an obligation
to try, and try hard.
This is an exciting period in history, and an exciting time in which
to live. It is a period which presents an extraordinary number of new
and difficult problems. But it also presents challenges and opportunities
that far exceed in size and long-term significance those of earlier and
more settled days:
The Nation's role in world affairs provides a compelling motivation
for all Americans to put their governmental houses in order.
Many new and developing countries look to the United States for
leadership and example in the organization and functioning of
democratic institutions.

American life is being urbanized at a breathtaking speed.
Automation is revolutionizing many aspects of our accustomed way
of life.
Civil rights has made more progress in the past decade than in the
preceding century.
American federalism is in a period of tremendous change. Twentyfive new grant-in-aid programs were enacted last year. Some
170 such programs now involve an annual expenditure of approximately $15 billion. The success of these programs is to
a large degree dependent on strong and effective state and local
government.

Much of the old rigidity that thwarted progress in the past is gone.
There is abroad in the land a willingness to think new thoughts
and to accept change.
What does all this mean to American state government? It means
a great deal. It has a tremendous bearing on the work of those who,
as members of constitutional conventions or commissions, seek to revise
old constitutions or to write new ones. These changes in American
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society affect the nature of the job, and how they undertake to discharge
their responsibilities.
The point is now being repeatedly emphasized in many quarters that
constitutional revision is the first essential in restoring the effective
functioning of state governments, and possibly even for their preservadon. There is no better time to begin than now. Later on could be too
late.
The Founders of our governmental institutions discharged their responsibilities in this area ably and well, so much so that all Americans
can be grateful for the excellent governmental heritage that is theirs.
These men tackled the problems of their day with courage and imagination, with wisdom and foresight. In confronting the problems
of this time, the present generation can afford to do no less. It must
deal with the problems of this day and age with a comparable degree
of imagination, with a willingess to move ahead, and even-if need be
-to take some chances. They did. Only by so doing can this generation deserve from those who will succeed it a degree of respect comparable to that which present-day Americans accord to those who
established and have since preserved and developed the Nation's governmental heritage.
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